i do not uh want to say that we should not take this particular you know three-way alliance uh as if it means nothing at all it certainly means something because it does have an impact on some of the assumptions we have made with regard to our policy in this particular region has all of this expanded pakistan's influence in the middle east yes i mean you know i mean I mean, we should acknowledge that there is a... I mean, you just look at where Pakistan is today compared to where it was before Operation Sindhu. How can we deny that Pakistan has, in fact, in a sense, you know, raised its profile geopolitically and including in the Gulf region? There are no two ways about it. And this does mean that we have to think again of how we respond to a very changed situation in the region. Is that a matter of concern for us that Pakistan has grazed its profile? Of course, whatever happens in this region is of great concern to us because, number one, you have 9 million Indians who are living and working across this region. I mean, that itself is a very, very major concern and should be factored into any kind of foreign policy planning. So to the extent that Pakistan has, in a sense, again located itself in a rather important position, and the fact that it was the interlocutor of choice for the negotiations on the Hormuz Strait, I think does indicate that we have to now once again face a Pakistan which has a greater profile in this region than it had before. No doubt about it. Hi, I'm Karan Thapar. Over the last few years, I hope you've been watching my program, The Interview on the Wire. During that period, I've interviewed doctors, politicians, businessmen, scientists, authors, and even the occasional Nobel laureate. For me it's been exciting, I hope it's been enjoyable for you. But these, as you know, are tough times, and if this program is going to remain bold, independent, and sometimes even defiant, then I think we need your support. At the end of the day, it's a truism, but editorial independence is best defended by the viewers. So if you would like this program to remain the way it is, forthright, outspoken, and interesting, then would you consider supporting us? All you have to do is to click on the description at the bottom. But more than anything else, I hope you will continue to watch the interview. Your viewership means an awful lot to me. The American Pronunciation Guide Presents ''How to Pronounce The Wire'' Hello and welcome to a special interview for The Wire. Does the three-nation Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani defence pact announced last week have serious and worrying implications for India? Does it strengthen Islamabad vis-à-vis New Delhi? Does it raise questions about India's relationship with Saudi Arabia and possibly also Israel? And how should the Modi government respond to this development? Those are some of the issues I shall raise today with one of India's most highly regarded former foreign secretaries, Shyam Saran. Shamsaran, let me start with a simple question. What do you believe are the implications for India of the Pakistan-Turkey-Saudi defence pact? Has it, as some analysts have said, put India on the back foot? I wouldn't go that far, but I would say that it certainly, as far as our relationship with Pakistan is concerned, it gives Pakistan a kind of a rhetorical advantage, because as you may have seen, the Pakistani defense minister has already linked this to Operation Sindur, saying that, you know, thanks to this Makkah defense pact, India will have to think twice about continuing with Operation Sindur. As you know, the Operation Sindur has only been paused. It has not concluded. So Pakistan will play this to the hilt. I mean, they will try to project this as something which is a big gain vis-a-vis India. I'm not sure that that is the case with regard to Turkey and Saudi Arabia. I think each one of them has a different objective in concluding this particular pact. And I am not very sure that the expectation that there would be a kind of a joint operation against India should such a situation arise. I do not think that we have to fear that. But having said that, this gives a certain kind of a rhetorical advantage to Pakistan. Let's look at India's relationship with each of the three countries involved in the Mecca Pact one by one. India, as you know, has a tense and difficult relationship with Pakistan. Has the fact Pakistan now has both Saudi Arabia and Turkey as defense allies strengthened Pakistan's hand? Well, you know, this is certainly a step up from what has been a history of very close military defense relations between Pakistan and Turkey going back several years and also between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia also going back several years There is in fact a former chief of the Pakistani army who is the head of I think it's for the anti-terrorism force which has been you know sort of a deployment. General Bajwa. That's right. So you know there is a long history of Pakistan's military relationship with Saudi Arabia. So I do not think in practical terms this means anything more than what I said, that maybe the three countries in the context of the kind of situation which they are facing, a growing unreliability of the US connection, the fact that they are faced with a very difficult security situation thanks to the closing of the state of Hormuz and the relationship with Iran. You should look at this more like a hedge, a diplomatic hedge, rather than a operational military alliance. Let's first look at its implications for Operation Sindhur. As the government has repeatedly said, Operation Sindhur is not ended. It's paused. It's on hold. Mr Modi has also fairly clearly said that India will respond militarily to any future terror attacks originating in Pakistan. But now, after this three country defense pact, will India have to think very carefully about how it responds to another Pahelgam style attack? I don't think so. You know, for example, look at, you know, currently the main security threat to Pakistan is coming from Afghanistan. Now, is there any expectation in Pakistan that either Saudi Arabia or Turkey is going to fight side by side with Pakistan against what it sees as a military threat from Afghanistan? I don't think so. So I don't think that this is a constraint in any way on India. The constraint will be what we ourselves consider to be the risks and maybe the potential gains involved should we decide to respond to another terrorist attack. When Operation Sindur happened last year, the Indian Army officially said that Turkish drones had been involved from the Pakistani side. Are you telling me that now that there's an official defence pact which didn't exist last year between Pakistan and Turkey, the Turks won't be involved more strongly on Pakistan side if there is a repeat of Sindur? There has been a certain progression in Pakistan's relations with Turkey which is very long-standing as I mentioned before. That it is not that it creates a new kind of relationship between Pakistan and Turkey But surely it does Surely it does This is a new pact that didn exist earlier It is a new pact but in practical terms as I said it already is layering over a long history of very close military to military relations between Pakistan and Turkey and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The new element here is that Saudi Arabia, which may have had very close relations with Pakistan, did not have the same kind of relationship with Turkey. Just a few years ago, if you remember, Turkey went ballistic over what had happened to Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. There was a very, very tense relationship for quite some time. So the change here that I see is the more important change in the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Turkey. And that is driven more by what is happening in the region rather than the specific to an Indian situation. Let me pursue this one more time. What do you say to people who say Shams Haran may be being a little complacent or relaxed when he is not taking seriously the security implications for India of a defense pact between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and Turkey? So there are a number of, you know, challenges that we are facing. The biggest challenge as far as this particular region is concerned, that our assumptions with regard to what the U.S., you know, strategic commitment to this region is concerned, those assumptions are coming unstuck. Take, for example, the I2U2. You know, this was, I think, based on the assumption that we don't have to worry anymore about, say, the Palestinian issue coming up in front. Secondly, that it was only a question of time before, for example, Saudi Arabia may join the I2U2 because there would be normalization of relations with Israel. And therefore, India would be part and parcel of a kind of a grouping or a kind of an arrangement, which would be patronized in a sense or fostered by the United States. But is that answering my question? I am answering your question by pointing to a larger context in which we should look at this. The larger context is that the bigger challenge for us is that the US commitment to this region and the US posture in this region has undergone a change. So that assumption which underlays some of the other things which we were doing like the I-2 and U-2 and also later on we may talk about IMEC, the context in which we were pursuing this has changed.
